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GENDER AS A DRIVING FORCE IN WAR

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1. Militarism and Masculinities

Thank you for that generous introduction. It's a great pleasure to be here in Hamilton, in company with this room full of interesting and engaged people from the university and the city. I'd like to thank the director, staff and council of the Centre for Peace Studies very much indeed for entrusting me with these lectures. I'd also like to thank the Leppman family, whose memorial fund for Keith Leppman has sponsored my visit. It's been a welcome opportunity to spend time with researchers and teachers here and to find out more about the important work being done here at McMaster University in women's studies and peace studies.

When I look to the list of previous Bertrand Russell peace lecturers and see the wealth of experience, and the huge authority, they've brought to this series of talks, I know I'm seriously underqualified for the task. Rather than suffering war, I live in a country that exports it to other regions. I don't have important responsibilities. I study violence from a safe distance. But there is one small thing I hold onto, that gives me a degree of confidence: it's the fact that what I'm going to talk about today and tomorrow I can bring to you rather directly from a host of women who are better positioned than I am to understand war. As a researcher, my work for as long as I can remember has been listening to women and men making sense of their lives. These lectures draw on the concluding chapters of a book published exactly a year ago that contained the findings of an empirical research project into women's organizing against militarism and war, that took me on 80,000 miles of travel to over twelve countries in two years (Cockburn 2007). So I'd like to acknowledge this debt and thank these women for sharing their analyses with me. They have a range of standpoints and perspectives, and I trust the sum of their perceptions.[*]

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Introduction: ways of seeing war and gender

In choosing the title for these talks, “Gender as a driving force in war”, I’m consciously making the strong case on gender and war. I could have chosen just to talk about “women and war” – focusing on what women represent as factors and actors in war. I could easily have talked about the deeply “gendered nature” of war, there’s plenty to say about that. But I’m going a step further here to suggest that gender has a certain causality in militarism and war – or more precisely the particular form taken by gender relations in patriarchy does so. I’m saying that it’s a motor, driving war along.

Of course, I’m not saying for one moment that gender is the only social power system implicated in war. Economics, yes, of course. International politics – antagonisms between ethnic communities, states and blocs. These are generally understood as the causes of war. Women antiwar activists are not bringing gender relations into the picture as an alternative but as an intrinsic, interwoven, inescapable part of the very same story. They are saying patriarchy is right in there with capitalism and ethno-nationalisms among the motors of war.

The reason they think it's important to address the possibility that gender-as-we-know-it plays a part in perpetuating war is because the idea has practical implications for our movements for demilitarization, disarmament and peace. After all, we’re ready to recognise that a sustainably peaceful society is going to have to be one different in certain ways from that of today, one in which, for a start, economic relations are more just and equal. And that it will have to be one in which national and ethnic relations are more respectful and inclusive. The women I've been working with would like to add something to this: they ask us to recognize that, to be sustainably peaceful, a society will also have to be one in which we live gender very differently from the way it's lived today.

And you know - I like to think that Bertrand Russell would agree with this idea. Did you know that he stood as a candidate in Wimbledon in a general election in 1907 on a platform of “votes for women”?

Where to begin? With war, perhaps. To say such a thing as “gender is a driving force in war”, war needs to be perceived in a particular way. We need to bring a sociologist’s or anthropologist’s eye to it. First of all, it needs to be recognized, as it certainly is in a Centre for Peace Studies, as a social phenomenon. It may be deadly, but it’s relational. It involves a degree of shared understanding between the warring factions. Only if war’s understood as relational, can we tease out, among the other relations, those of gender.

But war-fighting is only the tip of the iceberg, as it were, of an underlying, less immediate, set of relations – some people have called it “the war system”. So, secondly, to understand gender as a driving force in war, war needs to be understood in this way too – as systemic. The systemic quality can be defined in various ways. It can be seen in rather general terms as a cultural predisposition – Betty Reardon for instance in her book *Sexism*

and the War System sees our competitive Western social order itself as being a "war system", on the grounds that it's based on authoritarian principles, it ascribes more value to some human beings than to others, and is held in place by coercion (Reardon 1996). Or more concretely the war system can be seen as a set of institutions – Ministries of Defence, the arms industry, training academies and military suppliers, the Chiefs of Staff and their commands down to the sailor, the infantryman and aero-mechanic.

The system idea points us to a relationship between hardware, like bombs and battleships, and software: attitudes and cultures. And so it opens war up to a gender analysis. More value to some humans than others? Yes, women know about that. Cultures? Down your street, is it the done thing to pull a knife if another guy insults you?

So, war as relational, war as systemic - and a third thing: the idea that wars are linked together as a continuum over time. In looking at gender as a driving force feminists are referring not just to episodes of hot war but also to militarism (as a persisting mindset, expressed in philosophy, newspaper editorials, church sermons), and militarization (processes in economy and society that signify preparedness for war), and to the violence that persists in so-called peacetime.

So that's the kind of lens I'd like to suggest we adopt for a moment in looking at war – to see it as social, as systemic, and as involving a continuum of phases and cycles. This is not the "take" on war of a neo-realist international relations theorist. That would reveal other things it's certainly important to know about war. But it won't readily reveal gender.

To turn then to this second key word in my title: gender. One advance we made in the last half of the 20th century was to lodge this word securely in our vocabularies. It wasn't easy. In some languages it meant inventing a new word entirely. We realized we needed it to refer to differences between and among women and men, that we'd used to simply call "sex differences", but had now begun to see more clearly as products of culture. In the 1950s and 60s we learned to talk about "socialization", and later the "social construction of gender" – referring to all that hard work that's done in the family, at school, in training and workplaces to turn rather undifferentiated human beings into acceptable females or males for a given society.

We encountered another system here, the arrangements by which a society deals with sex and sexuality, marriage, reproduction and parenting: the sex/gender system. Gayle Rubin was the first to name it that way, back in 1975 (Rubin 1975).

Incidentally, while saying my thank you's, here's another debt. I'm going to mention quite a few authors as I go along. This isn't to be pedantic. Just as I owe a lot to the women I've interviewed, so I owe a lot to the women and men who've contributed to this field of knowledge. Gayle Rubin is one of them. If I cite them, it's to remind you of some old friends and maybe

introduce you to new ones. I have a bibliography with me if anyone's interested.

We also learned, over the last couple of decades of the century, to acknowledge the extraordinarily complex interactions of biology and culture - how important chromosomes and hormones are, but how non-determining they are, how flexibly nature's provisions are enacted in response to stimuli from the social environment.

In theory, almost any set of sex/gender arrangements could be found in our world. But all societies we know of today, and those of which we have reliable knowledge from the past, have been to some degree or another, and with institutional variations, characterized by male domination, female subordination. Gender-as-we-know-it is a relation of power.

We used to feel confident thirty or forty years ago of using the term "patriarchy", rule by the fathers, to name a sex/gender system characterized by male supremacy. But feminism got more subtle and noted that we needed to take account of historic phases of male dominance. Some noted that, since the Enlightenment, rule by the fathers in European society has given way to rule by men in general (Pateman 1988). Others noted that there'd been a shift from private to public male dominance (Walby 1990). And so the word "patriarchy" began to sound a bit archaic, a bit quaint. On the other hand nobody's come up with a handy alternative – we've tried "fratriarchy" and "andrarchy", but they don't catch on. We have a very powerful reality we're not sure how to name.

So we're stuck with "patriarchy", and actually I found wherever I went in the last few years, in the global south and global north, women were using patriarchy without hesitation in everyday speech. They know it. They live in it. Ann Oakley pioneered gender theory 35 years ago. Today she insists, "Patriarchy isn't an ancestral disease, it's a living institution. It's the default mode: what's always there and will always happen unless it's actively contested… We need to comprehend what goes on," she insists, "and what goes on is a constant fracturing of our humanness into divisive and destructive ways of being and living" (Oakley 2002:27). Men and women are specialized in patriarchy, the genders made complementary and unequal. Good qualities like strength and courage get allocated to men and deformed into tools for domination. Good qualities like tenderness and care get allocated to women and deformed into the badge of submission. Both parts of humanity end up as less than fully human. At the same time we collude in it, do its work. Patriarchy! "We're lost without it and lost within it", Ann Oakley says.

I need to say just one more thing about gender before moving on. It's the curious and annoying phenomenon of how statistics of differentiation by sex or gender both count and don't count, at one and the same time. You can say something with them but you can never say everything with them.

There's a sexual division of war, just as there's a sexual division of labour. In the labour market we can say (and I'm just being schematic here) that 85% of hairdressers are women and 90% of motor mechanics are men. In war you can establish that, let's say, in a given army, 90% of soldiers are men and in a given refugee camp 80% of adult inmates are women. These distributions do tell you something interesting about an overall difference in the lives of men and women. But there are always those 5,10 or 15% of anomalies that remain to be explained. Don't they disprove any case you might be trying to make about "the gendering of the labour market" or "the gendering of war"?

Well, yes and no. Yes, they prove that men can be hairdressers and women can be soldiers. But no, because if you look at the social significance, the lived experience, of male hairdressers and female hairdressers you actually find a non-equivalence. Because, look, it turns out that a lot of male hairdressers either are, or are treated as, gay. And men and women in the military? Non-equivalence again. A study in 2005 showed that almost half of all women serving in the UK Royal Air Force had been sexually harassed (*The Independent on Sunday*, 2005:1). They were typically harassed by two or more male servicemen of a senior rank. Only half these women had complained. The remainder thought if they did so it wouldn't be taken seriously or would adversely affect their career. The figures in a similar study in the USA in 2003 showed that 7 out of 10 women cadets in the US Air Force had been sexually harassed, and one in five had been raped by colleagues.

An honest young woman called Kayla Williams wrote a book she titled *Love My Rifle More Than You: Young and Female in the US Army.* She wrote "I've always been a girl that catches a guy's eyes. And yet I [can] do fifty-five push-ups in under a minute. [I'm] tough, and proud to be tough." But, she says, (and this was six months after she'd gone back to civilian life) [quote] "[sometimes even now] I wake up before dawn and forget that I'm NOT a slut" (Williams 2005:13). This cheery, confident young woman, striving to join the men, do a man's job, serve her country. For trying, this was the message she'd got from her male comrades in army life: you're nothing but a slag.

So, yes, a percentage of soldiers today may be female. But it's not the same to be a woman solder as a man soldier. It's not the same lived experience. It's not seen as being the same.

Patriarchy and its masculinities

Given this problem with statistics, that they hide as much as they reveal, in making the case for gender as a driving force in war I'm going to rely more on qualitative material. Rather than talking about numbers I'm going to talk about cultures. And remember too, please, that we're not talking about individual men and individual women, here - because it's not written in stone that the cultures we live in will capture and 'normalize' each and every one of us. Some of us escape, some of us don't match up, some of us 'fail' at gender, some individuals resist gender norms. This is about probabilities not certainties.

Today I'm going to focus on masculinity and how we can see a certain model of masculinity at work in the perpetuation of militarism, militarization and war. And that after all is probably the thought that occurs to us first in considering gender and violence, isn't it: that in certain versions, very widespread and influential versions, masculinity is truly a societal disaster. But the next thought that occurs is almost always: well - many forms of femininity are a disaster too. Women contribute to the disaster in many ways, through the way they rear boys, through their loyalty to violent men, and through emulating male forms of power.

So, yes, in case you're wondering, there will be a few horror stories about patriarchal feminity tomorrow. But meanwhile I want to hold the focus on masculinity, masculine cultures and their significance for the perpetuation of war.

I want to underpin this by noting first the interaction between two things - institutionalized structures of power and cultural processes. If you think about it, if a given social group (in this case men) are to retain their advantage from generation to generation, the system that sustains that set of arrangements (patriarchy) must reproduce itself. What's more, to endure over time in changing conditions (globalization, new technologies), it must reproduce adaptively. How does this happen? Adaptive reproduction involves a continuous cyclical interaction between, on the one hand structures, institutions, and on the other processes, cultures. We can see this clearly in the case of the sex/gender system. On the one hand things like the church, education, family, on the other ways of doing things, ways of carrying on. How you rear your children, how a teacher supervises the school playground, the message purveyed in the media, video games. The little day to day things adaptively reproduce the institutions over time. Living cultures of masculinity and femininity animate the structures, keep them up to date, enable them to survive.

Especially masculinity. As feminists we tend to think that what patriarchy has most to be afraid of is women rebelling and stepping out of bounds, so that the smooth reproduction of the system stalls. But actually I think it's masculinity that's patriarchy's biggest worry. For men as a social group to retain supremacy over women, as they have done extraordinarily well for at least five thousand years, men and masculinity absolutely must acquire a shape that's adequate to power.

And there is a problem here. The ruling economic class has material wealth on its side. Ascendant 'peoples' often have the mechanisms of the state in their hands. By contrast, the ruling sex, as such, has rather few and pitiful resources. Men don't have a larger or more complex brain than women, nor greater manual dexterity. They do have a 20 to 25% advantage in musculature, a few inches greater average height, a sex-specific hormonal energy - and a penis.

But the latter is a notoriously unreliable resource. I like the phrase Joanna Bourke has for it, “a hesitant and unstable organ”, she calls it (Bourke 2007:421). To achieve supremacy for men as a social group, the penis must be transformed into the phallus. The consolidation of the phallus, the symbolic power that extends physical power into the social domain, is achieved through the cultural process of masculinization. Masculinity must be produced in appropriate forms and activated in social institutions such as economic enterprises and political structures where patriarchy (men as men) can share some of the wealth and authority deriving from the systems of class and state supremacy. The church and the military are two institutions where, assisted on the one hand by ideology and the other by hardware, patriarchy has sustained the ascendancy of men with particularly striking success.

The cultural process of masculinization not only produces men as different from women, it produces some men as different from other men. So it’s better to speak of masculinities, in the plural. R.W.Connell was the first, I think, to point out that while one form of masculinity may be hegemonic in a given gender order, there are always others – working class masculinities, homosexual masculinities, subaltern masculinities among ethnic minorities and colonized peoples (Connell 1995). There are even, now and then, here and there, subversive masculinities, refusing their part in patriarchy - and they are a source of great hope.

It’s not always and in all societies that the hegemonic, ruling, form of masculinity is militarized. But in many it is. A clear example is Turkey. Ayse Gul Altinay has written about this in a really interesting study, The Myth of the Military-Nation (Altinay 2004). She shows how, in Turkey, where patriarchy, nationalism and militarism visibly shore each other up, lean on each other, define themselves in each others’ language, the paradigmatic ‘’Turk’ isn’t just a man, he’s a soldiering man.

Turkey, actually, made me think about the significance of honour in such a system. I’d been in the south-east Kurdish region where Ayse had taken me to visit Nebahat Accoc and her organization Ka-Mer. Ka-Mer protects women who are under threat of death for “dishonouring” (and I put this in quotes), dishonouring the patriarchal family. And as we drove around I noticed some words written in gigantic white letters across a hillside. The stones had been painted by the Turkish military, who patrol this area to keep down Kurdish insurgency, which has links in the neighbouring state of Iraq. The words were “The border is honour”. Kurdish and Turkish men, equally at home in the patriarchal family and the patriarchal military, each the sworn enemy of the other, understand each other only too well through this shared travesty of honour. “Travesty” because of course the word honour, honorable, at the same time has other, humane and worthy, meanings.

Among the women's organizations I met in the course of my research, one was a transnational network of women living in the Philippines, Japan and other countries with which the United States has agreements to locate military bases. They call themselves The Women's Network against Militarism, and they monitor and inform each other about US policy developments and the

damaging impact of the US bases on local life, particularly on women. These well-informed women activists are clear about the part played by patriarchy and masculinism in the region. "The basis of militarism is the strengthening of the patriarchal system," I heard Aida Santos say, thinking of the effect the US presence was having on her own country's gender relations. And in one of their pamphlets the Network write, "Masculinity, in many countries, including the United States, is defined in military terms. We need a redefinition of masculinity, strength, power, and adventure; an end to war toys and the glorification of war and warriors."

Most of the time, of course, the United States of America doesn't represent itself as militarized, but rather as the land of consumer choice, of political freedom and economic liberalism. But the reality is, its military expenditure at around $515 billion in the coming year, is getting towards equalling that of all other countries of the world combined. And although the US, unlike Turkey, doesn't have male military conscription, its armed forces currently stand at a massive 1.4 million, with another 1.4 million in the reserve. And those women of the Pacific region are right. Culturally, too, manhood and militarism, closely yoked, are visibly present in the USA as a kind of spinal column holding state and society erect.

Masculine policy making: the nation's posture

Men and women sociologists in the States have made some very interesting analyses of this phenomenon. I'll mention just two studies, one about US society as it entered the Vietnam war, one as it emerged from it. In these studies you can very clearly see gender relations pointing the way, so to speak, along the continuum of war.

A few years ago, Robert Dean decided to look back to the coldest years of the Cold War and wonder how foreign policy was made. In particular he asked himself "how did highly educated men, who prided themselves on hard-headed pragmatism, men who shunned "fuzzy-minded" idealism, [how did they] lead the United States into [such] a prolonged, futile, and destructive war…" ? (Dean 2001:1).

He decided to look at the policy-making group - John Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson and their circle - as complex, socially-constructed beings, shaped by quite specific cultures. He noted that they were the product of exclusive male-only institutions: boarding schools, Ivy League fraternities and secret societies, elite military units, and metropolitan men's clubs, places in which imperial traditions of service and sacrifice were fostered, places that were the source as he puts it of "an ideology of masculinity", imbuing men with a particular kind of manhood, ritually creating what he calls [quote] a "fictive brotherhood of warrior intellectuals" (Dean 2001:5).

This national elite, that defied all rationality in taking the US to war in Vietnam, inherited from their predecessors a "national security state" dedicated to the containment of communism and the expansion of a corporate capitalist world economic order. Some of you may remember how Kennedy

campaigned for office with a promise to halt America's decline into a flabbiness and impotence that had left the country vulnerable to the threat of a hard, ruthless Soviet empire. The US, he pronounced, had [quote] "gone soft -- physically, mentally, spiritually soft" (Dean 2001:169). The identity narrative of the imperial brotherhood, Dean shows, with its cult of courage and honour (honour again!), demanded rigid defence of boundaries and a despising of anything that looked like appeasement.

The second study I'll mention is Susan Jeffords analysis of novels and films of the post-Vietnam period - films like *First Blood*, and *Missing in Action*. The defeat of US might by a mere peasant army, the return of disabled and traumatized veterans, was shocking both to the state and to ordinary Americans. The war years had seen the emergence of a new left, draft-resisting youth and a startling self-assertion by women in second wave feminism. If the US was going to recover self-respect, if it was going to confidently project its power in the world again, strategies of remasculinization were badly needed (Jeffords 1989).

Jeffords looks carefully at something she saw taking place in US social relations in the late seventies and eighties, something to do with getting the nation state back into an erect posture. She calls what she sees [quote] "a large-scale renegotiation and regeneration of the interests, values, and projects of patriarchy" (Jeffords 1989:xi). She shows how films and novels about Vietnam stood the soldier/veteran back on his feet as hero, how they celebrated masculine bonding. This reworking of the Vietnam story totally eclipsed women and the feminine. What it did was to heal the wounded veteran (she says), acquit him of feminine weakness, so despised, and project that instead onto a wimpish government that had betrayed its men.

Susan Jeffords doesn't go quite as far as I'm going in these talks - she doesn't wish to suggest causal connections between gender and war. But she was writing in 1989. Three years later came the Gulf War. It wasn't only feminists then that felt one element, just one element, among the motive forces behind the USA's Operation 'Desert Storm' was a masculine redemption of the defeat in Vietnam. Later, in 2001, we'd see George Bush Junior's belligerent response to the attack on the twin towers. Susan Faludi has just written a new book – you've probably been reading the reviews – *The Terror Dream* it's called – which explores how both in reality and in media representations, post 9/11, there's been a hunt for male heroes (paradigmatically the New York fire fighters) while women have been refeminized, returned notionally and even to some degree factually, to domesticity. This is how America has dealt with its sense of impotence (Faludi 2008).

From boy to man, civilian to soldier

I want to turn now from the war policy moment to the grittier moment of the military boot camp and see how gender predispositions shape the preparation of men for war fighting. Because those elite policy-makers we've been talking about weren't the ones who paid the real cost of the Vietnam

war, and it's not they who are paying the price for Iraq. It's ordinary male human beings who are bribed, bullied, deformed and sent to the front to do terrible things in the service of political purposes. Some of you may have seen the film *In The Valley of Elah*? That's a very moving allegory of the power of the military experience to turn a nice young man into a monster. More important for my case, it also shows very distressingly the way the patriarchal imperative of manhood is imposed on the son by the father, acted by Tommy Lee Jones. First, his father's standards of masculinity leave the boy no option but to enlist if he is to prove himself a man. Then, serving in Iraq, the young man kills a civilian child. He weeps about it on the phone line home. His father, alarmed by this shaming effeminacy, asks nervously "is anyone listening to this?". Relieved to hear nobody has overheard, he urges his son back to continue his atrocities with a stiff upper lip.

You know…between 2000 and 2002 I listened carefully to more than a hundred women in Cyprus, a small island that accommodates the barracks and barbed wire of no less than seven armies, if you count a British base and a UN peacekeeping force, and which has compulsory conscription into rival Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot armies. The reason, more than any other, these women wanted peace is because of what this gender regime does to their sons. The army has the power to turn the child you love into the man you fear. In turn this man, now drilled in a lethal combination of ethnic scorn and masculine cockiness, becomes an impediment to peace.

But the chiefs of staff, battlefield commanders and drill sergeants have a serious human resource management problem turning men into soldiers. Some recruits are already scenting blood and straining at the leash, others are indifferent or plainly terrified. How is a functional army to be created out of thousands of men, coming from a variety of backgrounds? Each one must eventually be willing to kill and to die, but to do so only in a disciplined and approved manner.

Mind you, the tolerance of "beserkers" is greater in some armed forces than others. My friends among the Mano River Women's Peace Network in Sierra Leone could tell you about Foday Sankoh's Revolutionary United Front in the civil war of the late 1990s, where discipline was not at issue… How it was constituted out of a ready-and-waiting stratum of urban youth, high on drugs and drink, reinforced by criminals turned loose from the prisons. These young men were expected by their leaders to rape, and to mutilate with machete and handgun. The more atrocity the better.

By contrast, Western armies today are obliged to have a smidgin of regard to the squeamishness of TV viewers. It means the military commanders have to walk a fine line. Over-aggressive men won't do, but neither, for heaven's sake, will non-aggressive men. The process to which the new soldier recruit is subjected is to first haze, brutalize and break him, and then to rebuild his masculinity in a specific form. Those sergeants drive home with their obscenities a despising for any difference - using racial insult, denigration of homosexuals, and the objectification of women. Militarization calls on men to kill the woman in themselves. Civilian life has already

suppressed it – now it has to die. At the same time, what's so deeply sad, is that men are also prepared for war by appeal to the noblest sentiments, love of family and community, and a selfless courage.

John Horne, another social scientist who studies war, took a little liberty with Clausewitz when he wrote "war is masculinity by other means". To understand war, he said, we need to study "the dense associative life of men" (Horne 2004:31). In the boot camp we see most clearly the "homosociality" in which a man learns to bond with other men. As he's initiated into the company or the squad, his sense of entitlement – to a woman, any woman, all women, to use as he sees fit – already fostered since boyhood, is affirmed. And now, in war, he can expect to enact it without penalty.

I'll return to that tomorrow. For today, in coming to a close, I just want to establish one point. All the stories I've just now told you about men, masculinity and militarism are usually told to show how war shapes gender relations. And indeed it does. But I'm asking you here to see the influence simultaneously running the other way. It's because gender relations are what they are, because of the power and violence inherent in patriarchy, because a manly identity must have no truck with compromise, negotiation or acquiescence (necessary to peace, tainted with femininity) that we can say gender (as we live it) predisposes our societies to war, fosters militarization, denies peace a footing, and drives the continuum of war along.

Unless we achieve a transformation of gender cultures, relations and structures we won't be able to stop war, of this I'm sure. But let's put it more positively. Gender wisdom can contribute to peace. I think there are faint glimmers of awareness of this in some corners of some countries. But we seem to take one step forward and one step back. Look at this:

The other day I read a news clip in *The Guardian* (2008:15). You know, there's been quite some progress in nurseries and play groups where carers and parents, determined that they won't any longer encourage violent play in their children, have decided to rid the toy box of those plastic guns and pistols. This article stated that our government ministry, the Department for Children, Schools and Families (and the Children's Minister is a woman, Beverley Hughes) had now issued advice that boys (you guessed it!) should be encouraged to play with toy guns at nursery school. It had been observed that boys between three and five years old were falling behind their female classmates in all areas of learning. This was partly (the Ministry believed) because nursery staff had been trying to curb boys' desire for boisterous games involving weapons. Boys were more likely to become interested in education and would perform better, it was felt, if encouraged to pursue their chosen play. Transformative change in gender? No chance.

When I read this, I didn't know whether to laugh or cry. Actually I think what I wanted to do was e-mail Sandra Whitworth, here in Canada. I'd just been re-reading her great study of the gender contradictions of UN peacekeeping. You know, Sandra's work is so clear-sighted. And other women here in Canada… some of them set up the Women in Conflict Zones

Network next door at York University, and organized meetings for us in Toronto, and Sri Lanka and the former Yugoslavia. They've been very important to the rest of us working on these themes. They've thought so perceptively and deeply about gender and conflict.

But back to Sandra Whitworth… We once had such hope in UN peacekeeping, didn't we. For Canada, the myth of the transformed masculinity of the kindly "blue beret" died hurtfully in Somalia in 1993. It died for others of us at different times and places. Sandra puts her finger on the main contradiction. It lies in the reliance of peacekeeping on soldiers. "Soldiers aren't born, they're made," she writes. "And part of what goes into the making of a soldier is a celebration and reinforcement of some of the most aggressive, and most insecure, elements of masculinity….All the messages a soldier receives about appropriately masculine soldierly behaviour are fundamentally at odds with what's expected in a peace operation" (Whitworth 2004:16).

She traces the moves by feminists and allies in the United Nations, in the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, in the Security Council, to transform the gender relations of peacekeeping. And she shows how it fails. I've heard the same story from Carol Cohn, Felicity Hill and others who were close to the process. Feminists thought that 'mainstreaming' (as it's called), mainstreaming gender into the UN, would lead to gender transformation. It didn't. What happened was that instead of being challenged, gender difference and complementarity were actually affirmed in this process. The idea of "women" [in quotes] was welcomed. Resolution 1325 on "Women, Peace and Security" was passed, to wide acclaim. But this was women once again reified as victims - though now also to be utilized as a resource for peace. Militarism and the primacy of soldiering went unmentioned. The word masculinity remained unsayable, its traditional values unchallengable – in the Security Council, in the United Nations, as they are in the institutions most of us live and work in. A great work of subversion is needed. And men are the ones, I think, who have to do it.

Time to conclude. So let me just summarize the argument I've made here tonight. It's that if you look closely at war as a sociologist or anthropologist, you have in your hands a lens that reveals cultures, the detail of what's done. You see job adverts for the military, you see training, you see discipline and indiscipline, killing, rape and torture. If, as well, you look at war as a feminist, as well, you see the gender in all of this. And you look again at so-called peacetime. You see that the disposition in societies like those we live in, characterized by a patriarchal gender regime, is towards an association of masculinity with authority, coercion and violence. It's a masculinity (and a complementary femininity) that not only serves militarism very well indeed, but (and this is my argument) it seeks and needs militarism and war for its fulfilment. It shuns compromise and concession (the effeminate language of peace). Yes, of course, the violence of war is productive. It produces re-burnished ethnic identities, sharpened by memories of wrong and a desire for revenge. It produces armed masculinities, victimized women. But these war-honed gender relations again feed back perennially into the

spiralling continuum of war, for ever predisposing our world to violence, forever disturbing the peace.

2. Gender, Power and Violence

To recapitulate, then, a lot of women antiwar activists in countries as far apart as India and the USA, Colombia and Serbia, Sierra Leone and Korea, showed me that they perceive gender as a driving force in war, and that's the title I've given these talks. They say, yes, of course economics - need and greed – that's a cause of war. And yes, that other trope in international politics - nationalist grievance, hatred of foreigners, ethnic identity struggles – that's a cause of war too. But gender in the way we live it in patriarchal societies (and in different ways all of our societies are patriarchal) is also a motor perpetuating militarization, fuelling belligerence, driving war along. I've suggested that to see this happening we need to look at war in a particular way, as a sociologist or anthropologist, seeing it as social and relational, as systemic and as a continuum.

Now I want to look more closely at gender's interaction with those other, better understood, causes of war. I'd like to talk a little more explicitly about sexual violence in war. Then I'll move on to think about women in patriarchy – those sticking with the patriarchal job, sometimes promoting war; and those stepping out of line, sometimes into antiwar activism. I'd like to end by asking a question: what might seeing gender and war in the spirit of these lectures mean for strategy in our peace movements?

Causes of war and where to look for them

When we say "gender is a driving force in war" do we really mean to suggest causality or is it just rhetorical? I'm going to take a deep breath here and say yes: we mean it literally. But of course the verb "to cause" can be interpreted several ways. Gender isn't a "cause" of war in the usual sense. Well, OK, there may have once been a war fought "for" Helen of Troy. And that maybe was not so different from a war fought "for" oil wells or "for" national autonomy. But today patriarchal gender relations are among the causations of war in another sense, in the sense that they predispose societies to it. They make war likely. They make peace difficult to sustain. Consequently, as we'll see, gender manifests itself in a different way from other causes of war.

To be a bit schematic here, I'm going to illustrate this by singling out two important and indisputable sources of friction in intra-state and inter-state relations: economics and ethno-nationalist rivalries.

The economic motivators of war are usually rather clear to see. What are the aggressors demanding? What are the defenders defending? In early wars, five thousand years ago, we might see theft of grain surpluses; a little later maybe a demand for levies, taxes, tributes; water sources; control of trade routes. In internal revolutionary wars – let's say the Russian revolution of 1917 – the aim may be to seize control of the means of production. In African wars today you can see valuable minerals as a factor. Diamonds in West Africa. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, with 3.8 million war deaths in recent years, an economic factor is the minerals coltan and tantalite for computers and mobile phones.

The capitalist mode of production is essentially expansive, continually seeking new sources of material, cheaper labour forces, new consumers who can be persuaded they need new commodities. From 1898 when the USA defeated Spain and took control of the Philippines, Guam, Hawai'i, Puerto Rico and Cuba, US [quote] "interventions" have primarily been about maintaining and extending control of markets. There's often an economic motivation in wars that are presented as being about "security" – oil in Iraq for instance. So economic factors in war are written into the news headlines, so to speak, or at least it's not difficult to read them between the lines.

Another, perhaps the other major cause of war is that cluster of things that you might call "us and them", the constitution of an ethnic or national self and its others. Foreign-ness. Raids against the ones outside the walls of the first city states, the barbarians on the borders of the early empires. Later, the Infidel.

Some contemporary wars are fought by an insurgent ethnic group trying to get recognition inside a larger polity, looking for more autonomy or it's own state: like Kurds in Turkey aspiring to join Kurds in Iraq and Syria in a Kurdish state, and the Turkish military intent on stopping them. How do you detect this kind of racializing cause in war? You listen for what the ideologues are saying, the religious leaders. What's the propaganda, who's putting it out? You look to see what names are claimed by the fighters, what names they're imposing on others.

But where do you look to see gender as a causal factor in war? Not usually in the same places. Well, not often - but now and then it may surface in the public proclamations of war-makers. The perennial call to "defend our women and children", for instance. Or, rather curiously, in the case of George Bush's "war on terror" we've seen the use of the *enemy*'s women to justify war. A couple of months after 9/11, as the US prepared to attack Afghanistan, Laura Bush, the First Lady, was wheeled out front to do the woman thing. She gave a radio broadcast aimed [as she put it] "to kick off a world-wide effort to focus on the brutality against women and children by the al-Qaeda terrorist network and the Taliban... Only the terrorists and the Taliban," she said, "forbid education to women. Only the terrorists and the Taliban threaten to pull out women's fingernails for wearing nail polish." Well, maybe. But reasoning from the protection of women is often spurious, since the reasoners are often

equally busy exploiting women themselves. It turns out to be one patriarchy hitting another over the head with women.

War-fighting cultures, kinds of violence

No, I think we need to take altogether a different approach, and look in another place for the causality of gender in war. We need to look at cultures, cultures as they manifest themselves in societies before, in and after armed conflicts.

If we think of the war system as having a cyclical or spiralling life, as a continuum over time, proceeding from the discourse of militarist ideology, through material investment in militarization, aggressive policy-making, outbreaks of war, short firefights, prolonged stalemates, ceasefires, demobilization, provisional peace, rearmament etc., and if we look closely at the social relations in which individuals and groups enact these various steps, that's where it's easiest to see gender at work, pushing the wheel around.

The characteristic complementarity of patriarchal gender relations, its dyadic quality, specializes men and masculinity as wielders of authority and violence. It specializes women in compliance, nurture and support. I've already tried to show something of how this works, taking two moments in the continuum of war, the pre-war and post-war phases of national preparation and recovery after defeat (talking about the Vietnam period) and the phase of training men for combat. But now let's think for a moment about hot war, war fighting.

Historians and analysts of war routinely make the point that war isn't just aggression. Take Colin Creighton and Martin Shaw in the introduction to their classic collection of articles *The Sociology of War and Peace* (1987:3). They say "Aggression isn't force, force isn't violence, violence isn't killing, killing isn't war". Of course, they're right in a way: war's an institution, not fisticuffs. War is calculated. On the other hand, looking at war as a feminist, especially seeing it from inside the war zone, it isnt so easy to set aside "ordinary" aggression, force or violence as "not war". Women are saying loud and clear that they experience coercion by men in disturbingly similar forms in war and so-called peace.

War isn't only about sanctions and blockade, smart bombs and missiles. Soldiers sometimes get out of their armoured cars and use guns, fists and boots. Individual and collective emotions and responses do play a part in war-fighting. Some of them are violent. War as an "institution" is made up of, refreshed by and adaptively reproduced by violence as banal practice. Sometimes this is positively cultivated – yesterday we talked about the misogyny that drill sergeants bring to their job and instil in men during military training.

Some of the violence in war is not only gendered but sexualized. In peacetime, in everyday life, sexual violence is a commonplace, not an anomaly. It's inherent in patriarchy and it has meaning. Likewise sexual

violence isn't an aberration in war, it is an extension of normal patriarchal relations into wartime. And again it has meaning, a military meaning. It may be punitive; it may be genocidal. It may involve rape of men to destroy them by feminizing them. It may be recreational, about masculine bonding and morale, and in this sense it's not only enemy women who get raped, but also women of the men's own side, civilians, or women enlisted in the ranks of their own army. A survey of 558 women who served in US military in Vietnam showed that half had experienced sexual violence and 30% had been raped by their fellow soldiers (Morris 1996:655-6, cited by Bourke 2007:363).

In Guatemala, a thirty years' war is supposed to have ended with the accords of 1996. In that war you can see all the three sources of violence I'm talking about. It was an economic war (about land and landlessness, fruit plantations and foreign corporate interests), it was an ethnic war too (involving a genocide, by Latinos against the undervalued indigenous Maya peoples). But it was also a hugely sexualized and gendered war – with persistent and widespread rape, sexual torture and assassination, mainly by the state army. There's an inspiring group of women in Guatemala today called Actoras de Cambio who've taken on themselves the task of working with rape victims from the war, supporting them to talk for the first time about what happened. But one of the uncomfortable facts that is emerging as women begin to speak at last is that misogyny and violence against women has been there all along, part of Guatemalan life in so-called "peacetime", prefiguring the nature of the violence that would be deployed in war.

Since the war too. Actoras de Cambio work today in the midst of a slightly different, but not all that different epidemic, that's seen in some other countries too and that's being called femicide. In Guatemala, since they started counting in 2001, between three and five hundred women a year are being murdered. They are found raped and sexually mutilated, their bodies thrown in ditches and dumps. It adds to the feeling in Guatemala that the cycle of war continues. The feminist analysis you need, then, in order to understand pre-war and war you also need to understand post-war, when many of the same men, conditioned to violence in the same way, still not disarmed, continue the misogynist practices war gave them so much scope for. And then, instead of a constituency for pacification, you find many people are inclined to vote for a political leader that promises "an iron fist" (*mano dura*), who sees more violence as the only solution to violence. Land reform in Guatemala is still only a promise; indigenous people remain oppressed; and respect and regard for women, a valuing of women, has certainly not yet happened. And it's these things alone, and only all of them together, Actoras de Cambio say, that could establish something worthy of the name of peace in Guatemala.

The wars in Bosnia and other parts of the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s established in popular consciousness the fact that rape can sometimes be a military strategy, part of a process of ethnic cleansing or genocide. Bosnia can thus sometimes seem like a special case. But sexual violence is widely present in war. In a recent spell of desk research on sexual violence in war I downloaded Amnesty International Reports that cover no

less than 51 countries, in Africa, the Americas, Asia, Europe and the Middle East, that have experienced significant conflict-related sexual violence in the past 20 years. Before that, as we go back in time step by step, to the secession of Bangladesh in 1971, to the Partition of India in 1947, to the various theatres of World War II, to the Great War, we find sexual violence on a huge scale is endemic in war – although often under-reported.

The term sexual violence is used today in preference to rape because the word rape simply isn't adequate to the case. Women are raped in war with penises, but also - and usually not by one man alone but by groups of men - with fists, sticks and miscellaneous weapons, their breasts are cut off, their pregnant bellies sliced open. They are impaled. A large proportion of women die or are killed in the course of the sexualized torture that's called "rape".

The question is, are current mainstream perspectives on war, that see war as "an institution" (something explainable in a language of economic interest, international politics, national security) adequate to explain these things? What I've suggested here is, no, that we have delve beneath the cool "international relations" representation of war, to break the academic taboo on looking at "aggressiveness", and then, down here at the level of practices and cultures, when we see the violence clearly, ask questions about what kinds of violence, who does them to whom, and what if anything they may have to do with gender identities, gender antagonisms and gender power.

The violence inherent in systems of power

I think maybe we should return for a moment to patriarchy – because a necessary underpinning of the proposition I'm testing in these lectures is that gender power, economic power and ethno-national, racializing power are mutually shaping, deeply imbricated, and necessarily violent.

Again I'm being a little bit schematic here in naming the important power systems as only three. There are other dimensions along which power is distributed: age for instance; skin colour; physical strength and ability; or there's sometimes an urban – rural dimension to advantage. And so on. But as far as militarization and war are concerned I think it's safe to say that (1) economic power; (2) ethnic or national power embodied in community, religious and state structures; and (3) gender power, are the most significant systems.

One way we can look at them is from the standpoint of the individual. We can use these sociological terms "positionality" and "intersectionality". They're ugly and tedious words I know. They've become a bit of a fetish in academic sociology, but that's because they are genuinely useful. What they do is enable us to notice the way a person's individuality is partly defined by her or his positioning in relation to power – to various dimensions of power. A woman is never 'just' a woman. She may be a relatively wealthy Australian woman, let's say, and white, in contrast to aboriginal people. This means that while she's subordinate in terms of gender, she has an edge in terms of class and race. Sets of power relations intersect in her, as they do in all of us, to

constitute us as individuals but simultaneously as members of various collectivities.

The thing is this: when addressing war, feminists suggest, we need to recognize that intersectionality also and always works at the systemic level. The power system of economic class based on ownership of the means of production, the racializing power system of ethno-nationalism expressed in community authorities and states, and the power system that constitutes sex/gender hierarchy together shape human social structures, institutions and relational processes. Together they establish positions of relative power, thereby laying down the possibilities and probabilities for individuals and groups that variously inhabit them. No single one of them produces its effects in the absence of the other two. Ever, I think.

So it never makes sense, either, to look for the institutions, the structures, of gender power. The family? is that the real one? the only one? No. It's a mistake to expect to find institutions that just do a specialized gender job – or a specialized economic or other 'power mobilizing' job for that matter. A corporation or a bank may look as if it's 'just' an economic institution, a church or a mosque may look as if it's simply an ethnic institution, a family may seem to be merely a sex/gender institution. But look inside them and you find each and all sets of relations functioning at one and the same time: they are all economic, ethnic and gender institutions, though with different weighting. In corporations, almost all senior people are men. Churches often mobilize considerable wealth. And all the monotheistic clerical institutions are bastions of male power. Nationalists have interests in the patriarchal family. And so on. You cannot logically disconnect them, either the power systems themselves or the processes that express and sustain them. Intersectionality.

So we're suggesting here that militarization and war are caused, shaped, achieved and reproduced over time by all three systems of power. If one is at work, the others will be too. The gender drama is never absent: the male as subject, the female as alien, the alien (the one out there, and the alien inside us) as effeminate. This is why a theory of war and its causation is flawed if it lacks a gender dimension.

Most theories of war, in sociology and in international relations, do indeed lack this necessary third element. To those who evolve and deploy them, they seem perfectly complete and satisfying without it. When women, feminists, come along and introduce our insights into discussions of war, when we talk about women and gender, we're often told we're being trivial, we're forgetting "the big picture". Cynthia Enloe was your Bertrand Russell Peace lecturer a few years back. She's one person who's been brave enough to say about gender "but suppose this IS the big picture?" (Enloe 2005:280) I'm following her lead here, in wrapping gender tightly into the systems of power that predispose to war. Can you look at the big picture and persuade me that gender isn't part of it?

But to come at this from another direction, what has the view of power as intersected systems got to do with war? I think it's like this. Their emergence in human society, closely related in time, were all necessarily violent processes. They were all processes of constituting a self in relation to an inferiorized, exploited other – the rich man's landless labourer; the citizen's hated foreigner; the woman as men's property, commodified in bride price, sale or exchange price, in prostitution and the value of her children. All three processs were necessarily violent. People will not build pyramids without the whip. Foreigners won't bow to another's hegemony if it's not backed by coercion. Women won't be subdued without force.

So it isn't surprising that institutionalized warfare was born along with increasing accumulation of wealth, the early state and the establishment of patriarchies. Gerda Lerner's intensively researched book *The Creation of Patriarchy* shows this happening towards the end of the Neolithic in the emerging societies of the eastern Mediterranean (Lerner 1986). William Eckhardt, in a big study that reviews many other historians on war, evolves a "dialectical evolutionary theory", as he calls it, suggesting that the more "civilized" people became the more warlike they became. Civilization and war: it's a correlation he finds persisting in all regions and phases of history (Eckhardt 1992:4).

Women and patriarchal wars

So far in these talks I've paid a great deal of attention to men and masculinity and rather little to women. I promised to come back to this theme. We need to address two contradictory assumptions, first that women are every bit as war-prone as men, and second that women are naturally peaceful. The problem isn't: which one is true? *They both miss the point.*

Let's think about it. Because men and masculinity are privileged with superior agency in patriarchal cultures doesn't mean that women are passive or not valued at all. In fact women are endowed with great importance, but in a carefully defined and limited sphere – particularly in reproduction, both reproducing human life and reproducing the community's culture. In economically advanced societies, like Canada and Britain, capitalism has needed women in the labour force. This has helped women to escape some traditional constraints on their behaviour. But even so you can see a continuing concern about women's traditional responsibilities in the anxiety in official discourse around "working mothers" and "single parents".

The fact that women are second class citizens doesn't necessarily lead women to rebel against patriarchal expectations. Most of us settle for the particular status the system offers us – we sign up to what Deniz Kandiyoti calls the patriarchal bargain (Kandiyoti 1988). This doesn't mean, though, that women don't suffer under the terms imposed by a male power system. They do, and often in terrible ways. As Ann Oakley said of patriarchy – I cited her already – "We're lost without it, and we're lost within it" (Oakley 2002:27).

It's not a bit surprising if, in time of war, women often support militarization. In England as the First World War broke out some women engaged in a "white feather" campaign. If they saw an able-bodied man of draft age on the streets not wearing a soldier's uniform they shamed him by giving him a white feather to signify cowardice. Today, in the profoundly patriarchal culture of India's Hindu extremist organizations, women are cast as the selfless wife and mother. But in the massacre of Muslims in Gujerat in 2002 they certainly found some "agency". Women of the Sangh Parivar, the RSS and the VHP and their various women's wings, were out on the streets chiding the men for "wearing bangles" – in other words not being man enough to kill and rape Muslim women (International Initiative for Justice in Gujerat 2003). And in south and western Sudan groups of women known as the Hakama singers make up verses to urge their men to kill the men and rape the women of enemy ethnic groups. And it's not just "out there" or "back then". Cynthia Enloe talked to you when she was here about all the intricate ways civilian women are quietly induced to play an unquestioning part in support of societal militarization even in the USA today, even when they barely know it (Enloe 2000).

Political structures can often afford to place a woman at the helm without threatening the overall control of the wealthy men of the dominant cultural group. Sometimes these women are seen as suitable figureheads because they're part of a political family of powerful men - like Indira Gandhi. Sometimes the system lets a hardworking and ambitious woman through – like Margaret Thatcher. Female leaders may be, and these two were, just as belligerent as male leaders. Zillah Eisenstein has an interesting term for visible women like Hilary Clinton and Condoleezza Rice. Because they lead us on to think they're signs of a new equality, she calls them "sexual decoys" (Eisenstein 2007).

Instances like these I've cited, women urging men to war, women war leaders, are often used to undermine a feminist gender argument. And they do, when that argument is formulated as "men are war-prone". When the proposition is reformulated as "patriarchal gender relations are war-prone", such women illustrate and affirm the argument.

But - the systems of power are never stable, they all experience threats from within, defections, challenges. Class rule meets proletarian resistance. Ethnic domination is threatened by insurgencies. And some women rebel against male supremacy. Feminism isn't a new phenomenon, and it's not limited to certain parts of the world. Women have often managed to break the bounds, specially during anti-colonial independence movements. And if the forms taken by male dominance adapt over time (or for a time) it's often when they meet the limits of women's tolerance. Some women refuse the rules, and so do some men - because both sexes suffer from the tyrannies of gender, even if men as a sex can usually rely on a little pay-out from the patriarchal dividend. The difference is that women sometimes organize collectively against the sex/gender system, men more often simply drop out.

To exemplify all this, let's go to Serbia. Let's go to Belgrade, in the 1990s. No, let's go back further to the middle eighties, to Yugoslavia, as it was then. President Tito was holding together a federal state containing the Serb, Croat and other entities that had fought each other so bitterly in the Second World War. He'd forged a mixed economy, with a big component of state ownership. He'd gone a long way to "modernize" society. But there were women who were kicking at the persistence of male dominance in Yugoslavia, in the Party, in the state enterprises where men held most of the top jobs, and especially in the family - because Tito's reforms hadn't crossed the threshold of the family home. A healthy feminist movement was emerging in the cities - including Belgrade.

Then some of the elites in the republics, particularly in Serbia and Croatia, began to revive the old language of nationalism. They perceived some advantage in playing the communal card. They began to re-name themselves and others with ethnic names. (Neo-liberal capitalist interests had a hand in all this, as you know well, but there's no time to go into that part of the story.) Ideologues in the universities found elegant and vicious formulations for the new ideas. Militarized elements also nationalized themselves and started chafing at containment in the Yugoslav National Army. Women's reproductive rights came under attack – women weren't having enough children to augment the national stock. Simultaneously, their public status was undermined. Under the League of Communists there'd been a 30% quota of parliamentary seats reserved for women. In the 1990 elections the quota was dropped, and women's political representation collapsed almost entirely. Down to 2% or something.

The feminists in Belgrade, women like Staša Zajović, Lepa Mladjenović, Daša Duhaćek, Jasmina Tesanović, they saw all this happening – unbelievable! They were incredulous. They hung on to their unity with women in Llubljana and Zagreb and Sarajevo, against the spasm of rupture. The foundation of their solidarity was a starkly clear perception they all shared. What they could see in the collapsing Yugoslavia was another solidarity re-emerging, formidable and threatening, a solidarity between nationalism, militarism and patriarchy. This relationship is a kind of malign love affair. Nationalism's in love with patriarchy because patriarchy offers it women who'll surely breed true little patriots. Militarism's in love with patriarchy because its women offer up their sons to be soldiers. Patriarchy's in love with nationalism and militarism because they produce unambiguously masculine men. And here was the resurgent Orthodox Church, giving its blessing to this marriage of three ideologies and the offspring about to be born: genocide.

Many women joined in the ethno-national frenzy. But probably many others, ordinary women, wives and mothers (who knows what proportion of the whole?) were just deeply afraid, of losing their children and their husbands, of finding neighbours turn to enemies, perhaps of being killed. They closed their eyes and hoped.

But a handful of women, some of the feminists of the 1980s and a younger generation of women that joined them, stood up against Milosevic and against war. On Wednesday, 9 October 1991, calling themselves Žene u Crnom protiv Rata, Women in Black against War, a name they'd adopted from Israeli and Italian women activists, they held their first public demonstration. They boldly chose to stand right in the monumental heart of the city, in Republic Square. And these public demonstrations would continue weekly for years, all through the Bosnian war and the later conflict in Kosovo. The women were the only antiwar group to have a regular presence on the Belgrade street in these years.

As we in London are the only such group today. Because the Belgrade women inspired what's become a worldwide network of Women in Black. In London every Wednesday our Women in Black group stand in a silent vigil protesting about the UK's involvement in militarism and war, and giving information to passers-by.

Now the point of this story about Women in Black in Serbia is this: women couldn't have opposed militarism, nationalism and war, as *women*, in the way they did, if they had remained within the patriarchal system and ideology. Their disloyalty to power had to be total. This is something I think that's bound to find resonance here at McMaster University where the idea of "principle confronting power" is kept alive in Bertrand Russell's memory.

Back then, as well as keeping a defiant presence out of doors, Women in Black Belgrade set up house in a rented apartment. It became a refuge for draft resisters and deserters. When the wars started, probably three hundred thousand Serb men of military age went into exile rather than fight in a civil war between Yugoslavs. But a lot were trapped, and had to go into hiding. Giving emotional, moral and political support to some of the men who refused to fight was one of the practical ways women could act on their anti-patriarchal and anti-militarist ideas. Some of the men in turn became members of Women in Black. Some of them were gay, and together the women and men rethought their politics in such a way that Women in Black in Belgrade became a feminist organization of women and men that defined itself as antihomophobic as well as anti-nationalist and anti-militarist. Together they went on to build a Conscientious Objection Network that hasn't faded out with the end of hostilities. It's grown into a movement that's an intrinsic part of the struggle today to democratize the country.

Women in Black was actually only one of several feminist organizations that were set up in Belgrade during the war. They had an overlapping membership. Everyone would stand in Women in Black vigils, but most were involved in something else too. Some worked in practical ways with refugees in the Autonomous Women's Centre. Some taught in the informal Women's Studies Centre where they set out to develop the conceptual foundations of a women's response to the terrible times they were living through. There was a group of writers called Feminist Publishing '94 and they circulated these ideas, reaching out to a wider readership of women, some of them in what were becoming new states carved out of the former Yugoslavia, and some in

other countries. In these ways, reflecting on their actions while they acted, the Belgrade feminists developed and articulated a clear analysis of the institutions that had dragged them into war, of their nationalism, their militarism and their sexism. That analysis has been enormously helpful and influential to women in other countries and other wars. It inspires a lot of what I've been saying here tonight and yesterday.

This international movement of women against militarism and war of which the Women in Black network is a part, takes its place in a wider and growing movement of movements, movements of both men and women: peace movements, antimilitarist movements, movements for nuclear disarmament, movements against the arms trade, against particular wars, campaigns for troop withdrawals, and so on.

And although the women's part and the majority in the mainstream share important goals, and often join in common actions, there's a foundational difference that is troubling. The analysis I've put forward in these lectures, which derives from the former, isn't understood, and if understood it mostly isn't welcome, in the latter. I don't know how it would be in the Canadian Peace Alliance. But the mainstream anti-war coalitions that I know of simply don't "get" the gender story. They don't see that if anti-militarist and anti-war organizing is to be strong and to the point, women must oppose war not only as people but as women. And men must oppose it in their own gender identity – as men. You shall not exploit my masculinity for war. The country's *manhood*? No, not in my name.

This analysis-gap wouldn't matter perhaps, if it weren't that it implies a strategy-gap: the mainstream movement lacks a gender strategy, an indispensable aspect of the process of transforming societies from war-prone to peace-sustaining societies. All our movements, I think it's safe to say, whether they're socialist or anarchist, or feminist, or draw pacifist principles from religious belief (like the organizations of the Quakers), all of us share a conviction that economic injustices and inequalities must be ended if peace to prevail. So all of us have a critique of neoliberal global capitalism. All of them likewise understand that racial inequalities, ethnic exclusions, the vanity of nations (as Billy Bragg's words to the *Internationale* put it) have to be put right if war is to end. So we share extreme caution with regard to the national flag.

But it's only the women's part of the movement that's saying, "Hang on a moment. Patriarchy has something to do with all this. We can't hope for a non-violent world if we don't transform gender-as-we-know-it, if we don't redefine manhood and womanhood, being masculine or feminine." Antiwar strategies have to openly address patriarchal culture – for instance the way masculine values (particular definitions of honour for instance) and qualities sought in men (a belligerent response to perceived challenges) contribute to making war thinkable, to making it seem an appropriate or inevitable response to political problems.

And here's the crunch of course – also: our strategies need to see and address the patriarchalism in the antiwar movement itself. Because what's

driven some women to organize separately from the mainstream is not only its imperviousness to a gender analysis and lack of a gender strategy, but also a failure of process. Their organizational structures, the practices of leadership, the language and style of activism too often privilege masculinity.

I don't have answers, I don't think any of us do, to what exactly would change in our practices as peace activists if we were to bring to life the perception that "gender is a driving force in war". In the research I'm just now wanting to start, and to get funding for, I plan to go, in company with women of feminist antiwar groups in a number of different countries, into the mainstream movements and pose the question, see what we learn from them, see what they may be able to learn from us, look for greater coherence in our strategies and perhaps generate more co-operative forms of activism. What might it mean in Canada? Maybe we can start such a discussion among us even here and now. Thank you very much for listening so patiently.

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