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Snagged On The Contradiction: NATO, UNSC Resolution 1325, and Feminist Responses

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Feminist antimilitarists in a host of countries and contexts are struggling with the contradictions inherent in UN Security Council Resolution 1325 of 31 October 2000 on *Women, Peace and Security*. It was 'our' achievement. It was 'our' project and 'our' success. Yet the more energetically we push for its implementation, the more we see its limitations. Worse, we realize how it can be used for ends quite contrary to those we intended. In this respect, NATO is a thought-provoking case. No.... more than that, it's an enraging example of how good feminist work can be manipulated by a patriarchal and militarist institution.

UNSC Resolution 1325 as a feminist achievement

When I say Resolution 1325 was 'our' achievement – it may well be the only Security Council resolution for which the groundwork, the diplomacy and lobbying, the drafting and redrafting, was almost entirely the work of civil society, of non-governmental organizations. Certainly it was the first in which the actors were almost all women. I have written about this elsewhere.¹

Passing the Resolution involved the Security Council in a two-day debate. It was the first time since the foundation of the UN that this august body, the pinnacle of the UN structure, had devoted an entire session to debating women's issues.² That this happened was due to the brave and persistent efforts of women from many countries. The Resolution was achieved by a wide, nameless, *ad hoc* transnational network of women in local and international NGOs, joined by women from member state governments, several UN departments and agencies, and academic feminists in universities. It entailed co-operation between women very differently positioned in relation to structures of power, and differently located in relation to wars. It was an informal, unnamed but highly productive alliance, that came together for no other purpose than this specific project. It involved the skilled handling of complicated mechanisms of power at the UN, in which they encountered resistance from many sources, including reluctant individuals and governments, and the inertia of institutional processes.

Among the international NGOs involved were Amnesty International, International Alert, the Hague Appeal for Peace, the Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children, the International Peace Research Association, the Women's Caucus for Gender Justice and most importantly the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF). Not all of these organizations, nor their key women activists, would call themselves feminist -

although many would. But the work they did in conceiving, drafting and chasing this Resolution through the UN system was certainly *feminist work*. It was explicitly-feminist Felicity Hill at WILPF's New York office who did a great deal of the leg work. She and WILPF were at the heart of this transnational advocacy network. And it is significant that today she is deeply distressed and angered by what 1325 has become in practice.³

The Resolution's content is brief and its intention easily grasped.⁴ The preamble acknowledges both the specific effect of armed conflict on women and women's role in preventing and resolving conflict, setting these in the context of the Security Council's responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. It has eighteen brief points covering, broadly speaking, three main themes. One is *protection*, including the recognition of women's rights, a clearer understanding of gender-specific needs in time of war, the protection of women and girls from gender-based violence, particularly rape and other forms of sexual abuse, and an end to impunity for these crimes. A second is *participation*. Women's work for peace must be recognized, they must be included in decision-making at all levels in national and regional institutions, including in significant posts in the UN itself, in mechanisms for the prevention and management of conflict, and in negotiations for peace. A third theme is the insertion of a *gender perspective* into UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs), and in measures of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration after war (DDR).

NATO and UNSC Resolution 1325

So far so good. But there followed the challenge of getting the new instrument implemented, getting governments to commit to it, getting it put into action in peace-making initiatives and peace-keeping operations. That task has engaged many women and women's organizations in a great deal of sustained effort from that day to this.⁵ They have had to 'get their hands dirty', negotiating not only with member governments but also with state militaries, for they are the ones who 'man' the aforesaid 'peace-keeping operations'. Who but they can ensure that women's concerns are addressed by the UN 'blue beret' units that work among the distressed populations in conflict and post-conflict situations?

Up to a point, 'implementing 1325' could mean relatively unproblematic and even creative encounters with the 'civil-military' functionaries of relatively benign state armies like those of the Netherlands, a country which sees its army more as a peace-keeping than a war-fighting army.⁶ However, many of the armies of Western Europe (and increasingly of Eastern Europe and even further afield) are marshalled within, and often commanded by, the structures of the North Atlantic Alliance, by NATO. In our No-to-NATO movement we have developed a strong, sustained and carefully argued critique of the Alliance. It may speak the dainty language of 'security', we say, but its actions show it to be an ambitious, expansionist and belligerent war-machine, primarily serving the economic and strategic interests of the more powerful among its member states.⁷

NATO has adopted UNSC Resolution 1325 with an energy that could easily pass for enthusiasm. A glance at its website will show 47 documents relating to the topic.⁸ A multi-media exhibition has been mounted of NATO's contribution to implementation of the Resolution (September 2010). There are pleasing photos of young women in army fatigues carrying babies, waving to children. NATO even celebrates International Women's Day. Apparently standing shoulder to shoulder with the women's movement, Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen asked, on 8 March 2010, 'Would a world in which women enjoyed rights equal to those of men be safer and more stable? It is difficult to say, but ultimately a lasting peace in many of the world's most troubled areas may depend upon the answer'.⁹

The Alliance was, it is true, rather slow off the mark at first in grasping the merits of Resolution 1325. They made their first move in 2007, seven years after the it came into effect, and in doing so they addressed action on 'women, peace and security' (WPS), from the start, as a joint policy initiative between NATO and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. In other words the 28 NATO member states didn't go it alone. They decided, for their own reasons, to include the 22 'Partnership for Peace' states. This would be, they said 'a true partnership policy for an issue of global interest'.¹⁰ They set up an informal 'ad hoc group' to progress the matter. It was the following summer, 2008, that the North Atlantic Council 'tasked' the NATO Strategic Command to provide guidance on implementing 1325. In other words, this was the point when the big political boys asked the big military boys to put their mind to women. The result was Bi-Strategic Command guidelines to be 'taken forward' by the NATO civil and military authorities. All these member and 'partner' nations were urged to adopt National Action Plans on the Resolution. The Alliance envisioned 1325 policy on WPS as 'an integral part of NATO's corporate identity, in the way it plans and conducts its everyday business and organises its civilian and military *structures*'. It should also be fully integrated into 'all aspects of NATO-led *operations*' (my emphasis).¹¹

Even now however things didn't move all that fast. In early 2009 when the 60th NATO Summit meeting took place in Strasbourg / Kehl, all they could say was that NATO was 'actively engaged with its partners in supporting' implementation of 1325, and hoped to have a comprehensive set of measures in eighteen months' time, viz. autumn 2010. In early 2010 some NATO nations prompted action, and two reports were written.¹² In June the Defence Ministers of all the nations contributing to ISAF in Afghanistan and KFOR in Kosovo endorsed action on 1325 in time for the Lisbon Summit on November 20-21. Simultaneously the 1325 policy was extended even beyond PfP to the additional states known as 'Contact Countries' and those participating in the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative.¹³

By now a number of the NATO Committees had the implementation of 1325 within their brief. The lead committee on this gender business is the important Political and Partnerships Committee. Significantly the Operations Policy Committee too is involved, integrating WPS into the context of NATO missions and ops. On the soldiering side, NATO's Committee on Women in the Armed Forces was converted in the summer of 2009 into a Committee on

Gender Perspectives, and an Office on Gender Perspectives was established in the International Military Staff. Clearly NATO was being thorough. It was making a serious effort to 'mainstream' gender, or more precisely WPS awareness, throughout its structures and activities. And indeed it described mainstreaming as the first of the five strategies comprising its 'pragmatic approach' to implementation. The other four were co-operation with international organizations;¹⁴ operations (most importantly Afghanistan); education and training; and 'public diplomacy', mobilizing the media to tell the world how much NATO is doing on WPS.

So how were they actually conceptualizing the NATO contribution to UNSC Resolution 1325? In January 2010 NATO joined in the celebrations of the tenth anniversary of the passing of the Resolution. To mark the occasion, Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen gave a speech at the European Commission on 'Empowering Women in Peace and Security'.¹⁵ He spoke of 'the ongoing victimisation of women in conflict situations and the marginalisation of women in matters of peace-building' as having a profound impact on global security, and being one of 'the key security issues of our time'. By now NATO was well up to speed, and he was therefore able to say 'NATO has heard this call. Our military authorities have developed guidelines for the integration of gender issues into all NATO planning and operations'. He mentioned a strict 'Code of Behaviour' for all NATO military personnel, a significantly increased proportion of women on NATO's political staff, and he added, 'we have studied carefully the significance of gender issues to the success of our operation in Afghanistan'.¹⁶

There are two areas of NATO activity in which the response to 1325 should be examined more closely. Both were mentioned by the Secretary General in his 10th anniversary speech. One is women soldiers, women in the military forces of nation states that come under NATO command. NATO's stated aim is to increase the proportion of women in the militaries. The Secretary General noted that the percentage of women in the armed forces of member states ranges widely, from as low as 3% in some states to as many as 18% in others. In accounting for the shortfall of armed service women in some countries, he tactfully mentioned 'member countries' military traditions'. The recruitment of more women had to be 'gradual' he acknowledged, but did 'need to be consciously tackled'.

The second area is 'operations' and in this respect Afghanistan is particularly interesting. The Secretary General mentioned the presence today of high-level gender advisers in ISAF HQ in Kabul, and gender experts employed in Provincial Reconstruction Teams. He noted that the US Marine Corps had begun fielding all-women military units in the most troubled provinces, 'with highly positive results'. ISAF were having difficulty recruiting all the gender specialists, female interpreters and women soldiers they believe they need. But the WPS policy in place had already 'allowed us to improve our mission effectiveness; our protection of the civilian population; and the protection of our own forces. And it has allowed us to reach out more effectively to the entire Afghan population'. Dr. Stefanie Babst, Acting NATO Assistant Secretary, is a 'flagship' senior woman for NATO. A week or so

before the Lisbon Summit in November 2010, she addressed a NATO conference held in Tallinn, Estonia, on *Women, Peace and Security: the Afghan view*. She said that ‘as a result of our engagement in Afghanistan, we have moved from an organization *talking* about how to deliver 1325, to one that is *actually implementing it*’ (her emphasis).¹⁷

So what is the kind of thing ISAF do on WPS in Afghanistan? They provide gender awareness training to the civilian and military teams before these deploy on operations. They teach soldiers gender-sensitivity - why it matters to take a different approach when searching an Afghan woman or man, or why male ISAF personnel should avoid looking an Afghan woman in the face. The gender experts in the field advise commanders of what women in local communities need when it comes to providing access to aid and services. Some NATO nations deploy Female Engagement Teams (FETs) in southern Afghanistan, designed to enable dialogue with local women. They have female soldiers who can conduct searches on Afghan women at checkpoints ‘without causing offence’, and female military doctors and nurses to run clinics for women. ISAF are, besides, helping train women police, security and even army personnel, some of whom in turn become instructors. They trained ‘Khatool Mohammadzai, the country’s first ever female paratrooper’. Babst wrote of this achievement, ‘Anyone who knows anything about Afghanistan realizes what an historic step that is. It is a real indication of the change for the better we are seeing in Afghanistan’. If more girls are going to school, more women are setting up businesses, more getting the health care they need and more getting elected to Parliament, this is (she implied) thanks to the NATO operation. Babst concluded ‘That is UNSCR 1325 in action where it really matters most’.¹⁸

The contradiction inherent in Resolution 1325

As feminist antimilitarists, as women of the No-to-NATO movement, how should we respond to the espousal by NATO of UNSC Resolution 1325? After all, the instrument was universally welcomed by women. Its objectives were irrefutably sound - to draw attention to the impact of armed conflict specifically on women, while at the same time getting women recognized not as mere victims but as actors, capable of contributing to the ending of war, to achieving peace and redefining security. One can imagine that the United Nations Security Council might see NATO as an exemplary institution, implementing the resolution in pretty much the manner desired - and desired not only by the UN (we suppose), but by the women who drafted the Resolution and pressed the Security Council to pass it. Many of the measures NATO are introducing in Afghanistan, as described above, are, *in the circumstances*, desirable. Given that ISAF is present in Afghanistan, we can only be glad if NATO personnel, prompted by 1325, behave respectfully towards women and try not to make their lives any worse than they need be. If Afghan women are to be searched at checkpoints, it is certainly more desirable that they should be handled by women than men. Yet, how can we who oppose NATO, who deplore its very existence and its war in Afghanistan – how can we welcome its espousal of ‘our’ Resolution 1325? Especially

when that war was legitimated, by those who launched it, in part by its potential for liberating women from fundamentalist oppression.

I would suggest that there are at least four elements in the contradiction that is now anguishing many feminist antimilitarists, not least ourselves in the No-to-NATO movement.

The most obvious and fundamental is the perennial 'equality' dilemma. in feminism. At many moments in the history of the women's movement a divergence has surfaced between women who call for 'equality' and those who assert 'difference'. Those who stress 'equality' believe that the equal treatment of women is simple justice. Those who stress 'difference' believe equality is too easily interpreted as 'equality with men in a men's world'. They call for transformative change in gender power relations and a valorization of women and the feminine. Yet in turn (and here in lies the contradiction) the positive assertion of difference can become an undesirable entrenchment of complementarity in gender relations, trapping us in the gender dichotomy. The divergence between 'equality' and 'difference' strategies becomes seriously divisive when the equality demanded by women concerns access to roles that self-evidently enhance patriarchal, capitalist, nationalist or militarist power. Serving in the armed forces is an acutely troubling case in point. It should be noted that UNSC Resolution 1325 does *not* in fact call for more women in armies. It urges, in rather careful terms, an expansion of 'the role and contribution of women in United Nations field-based operations, and especially among military observers, civilian police, human rights and humanitarian personnel'. In promoting a higher proportion of women in militaries, NATO is not *actually* 'implementing 1325'. The feminization of soldiering is (in my interpretation at least) rather part of NATO's thrust to modernize and professionalize contributing national armies. It has picked up the ball of gender equality thrown into play by feminists and is running with it for its own objectives. What can we do as feminists in such a situation? We have surely to stress that equality is a matter of justice, and in a just and inclusive society women should not be debarred on account of their gender from doing anything they want to do. (Just as ethnic minorities should not be debarred from the police force for instance.) But we must simultaneously critique and seek to dismantle *all* the power relations that deform and subvert not only justice in employment, but the quality of human life and relationships – including those of militarism. We should never imagine that the struggle for equality can be pursued, anywhere or ever, except hand in hand with an unrelenting struggle for transformative change in gender and other power relations.

The second contradiction I believe goes like this: NATO is a militarist organization; *yet* the intention of 1325 is antimilitarist; *yet* its wording and provisions leave it co-optable by militarism. In fact, back in 2000, in New York, the ink was scarcely dry on the document before quite a lot of the feminist women involved were voicing self-criticism about their failure to frame the 1325 measures within a strong statement about ending militarism, militarization and war itself. They were advised by those close to the UN system, and indeed informed by common sense, that the Security Council

would not stomach any insistence from the women on including in the Resolution a sharp critique of militarism, militarization and the pursuit of war policies by member states. That is indeed why the women originators of the Resolution censored themselves. All the same, the UN was created to put an end to war. The Security Council's primary responsibility, under the Charter, is the maintenance of international peace and security.¹⁹ Some of the women now wondered, 'should we not have called the Security Council's bluff?'²⁰ Four years later Carol Cohn neatly summarized the effect of their failure to engage in struggle with the Security Council on this issue. She wrote,

Protecting women *in war*, and insisting that they have an equal right to participate in the processes and negotiations that *end* particular wars, both leave *war* itself in place... [1325 is not] an intervention that tries either to prevent war, or to contest the legitimacy of the systems that produce war - that is, 'to put an end to war'. In this sense it fits comfortably into the already extant concepts and discursive practices of the Security Council, where the dominant paradigm holds a world made up of states that 'defend' *state* security through *military* means...Letting (some) women into decision-making positions seems a small price to pay for leaving the war system essentially undisturbed.²¹

The third contradiction is inherent in *the several interpretations to which the word 'security' lends itself*. Women have been at pains for a decade or more now to redefine 'security'.²² We readily adopted the critique of military conceptions of security by those who began to speak and write of 'human security'.²³ Then, in the concept of 'women's security', we gave 'human security' gender specificity.²⁴ This was, for feminists, the meaning of the word in the title of the Resolution: *Women, Peace and Security*. The ideal of 'security' can however too readily be manipulated by an organization such as NATO that, however it describes security in words, manifests it in action as meaning the militarization of society and a readiness to fight wars.

Fourth, and finally, some of the women who were involved in the movement to obtain Resolution 1325 were self-critical afterwards on the grounds that they had failed at any point to express *an explicit critique of men, masculinity and patriarchy* in relation to militarism, militarization and war. The Resolution said nothing about the male-dominant gender order in which we all live, the supremacy of men in political and military systems, the affinity of military values with hegemonic masculine values, and the overwhelming statistical preponderance of men in actual acts of violence against both men and women, whether in peace or war. As Carol Cohn put it, to have the effect we desire, as feminists, the women transnational activists in this story would have had to address 'the pernicious, pervasive complexities of the gender regimes that undergird not only individual wars but the entire war system'.²⁵ (I argue that we should go further and recognize gender power relations as a predisposing, and thus causal, factor in militarization and war.²⁶) The fact is that just as the UN cannot criticize the USA, capitalism and militarization, so it is quite unable to make any critique of masculinity. Sandra Whitworth would later write in her post-1325 study of UN peacekeeping, 'There is...no discussion within UN documents of militarism or militarized masculinities or,

for that matter, of masculinities more generally' (Whitworth 2004:137). It may be beyond the bounds of reason to imagine the Security Council taking the (albeit logical) step from deploring the rape of women in war to pointing the finger at men's perennial propensity for violence and specifically for sexual violence against women. Yet – this silence on men, masculinity and the male-dominant gender order has vitiated Resolution 1325. In the absence of a strong statement against the 'co-production' of hegemonic masculinity and militarism, it becomes little more than an aspiration, on the one hand to make war a bit safer for women, on the other to alert the powers-that-be to the resource women can be in helping them do their job. The Resolution is left hostage to co-optation by militarist states and military institutions for military purposes.

Some questions we might ask ourselves

Some things we might usefully discuss in the context of No-to-NATO and the Women-against-NATO network could now be:²⁷

1: Has the Resolution become 'reified', even 'deified'? It is as if nothing had been said before about women, peace and security. The Women's International League for Peace and Freedom have been arguing this case since 1915 and feminist antimilitarism, as an analysis, had already far outstripped this formulation of women's (and men's) relationship to war by the early 1980s.²⁸

2: Surely we intended the Resolution to create political space for women to express opinions and take assertive action on every war / security issue, in every country, at every moment, including military expenditures (which have been relentlessly growing since 2000) and 'international' military missions which continue today as the 'no-fly-zone' operation unloads Tomahawk missiles on Libya? It has rarely been used as such a lever. Instead the 1325 agenda has shrunk to protecting women war victims and obligingly remembering to use the resource women represent for peace.

3: Should we be more pro-active in contesting the way the feminist agenda has been recuperated by armies justifying the recruitment of more women to the military by reference to Resolution 1325?

4: Should we be pressing harder for something 1325 didn't mention, ensuring that post-war moments bring the redistribution of power and resources in several dimensions – wealth, land ownership, economic opportunity, minority rights etc. (all of which of course affect women) *and* the dismantling of male supremacy, decommissioning masculinity while disarming combatants?

5: Should we be concerned about the way 'doing gender' (mainstreaming) in implementation of 1325 has become a 'soft', ill-defined and easy-option activity in the institutions, to which very often unskilled, unknowledgeable women and men, often interns, or people who already have other more pressing tasks, are appointed as practitioners, consultants or advisers. This

not only makes 'doing gender' non-feminist, ie. non-transformational. It leaves it even technically deficient.

6: Were we wrong from the start to place so much reliance on the United Nations, and in particular on the (almost universally) male Security Council? Every time we rousingly cite Resolution 1325 we are acting as cheer leaders for a body that doesn't deserve it. Its increasing closeness to NATO is surely evidence that the UN is not a mechanism for peace and security as women (and other antimilitarist activists such as No-to-NATO) define those things. Is it a waste of time, or worse, to put our energies into the UN? On the other hand, can we afford to neglect doing so?

7: As feminist antimilitarist women do we need to step up more boldly and make ourselves heard raising tough questions about the part played by gender power relations in militarism, militarization, foreign and military policy and war fighting –including the way an institution like NATO functions? Should we grasp the political responsibilities that come with 'participation' in 'women, peace and security'? If so, how and where?

NOTES:

¹ Chapter 5 of my book *From Where We Stand: War, Women's Activism and Feminist Analysis*. Zed Books, 2007.

² Cohn, Carol et al, 'Women, peace and security', *International Feminist Journal of Politics*, Vol.6 (1). 2004.

³ Personal communication.

⁴ The text of UNSC Resolution 1325 can be seen at <http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/2000/sc2000.htm>. A useful point-by-point annotation has been produced by the United Nations Development Fund for Women, see 'Security Council Resolution 1325 Annotated and Explained' at www.womenwarpeace.org/toolbox/annot1325.htm, accessed 23 January 2006.

⁵ See the website www.peacewomen.org.

⁶ Dudink, Stefan 'The unheroic men of a moral nation: masculinity and nation in modern Dutch history' in Cockburn, C and Dubravka Zarkov, *The Postwar Moment: Militaries, Masculinities and International Peacekeeping*. Lawrence and Wishart, 2002.

⁷ See <http://www.no-to-nato.org>, site in process of development.

⁸ <http://www.nato.int> accessed 14 April 2011.

⁹ 'Women's Rights: A Matter of Peace and Stability', speech by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, 8 March 2010. Accessed http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_61802.htm > 7.4.11.

¹⁰ 'Comprehensive report on the NATO/EAPC policy on the implementation of UNSCR 1325 on women, peace and security and related resolutions'. 20 November 2010. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68578.htm?selectedLocale=en > 7.4.11

¹¹ As footnote 7.

¹² As footnote 7. They were (1) a comprehensive report with recommendations on mainstreaming UNSCR 1325 in NATO-led operations and missions; and (2) a comprehensive

report with recommendations on the NATO/EAPC policy on the implementation of UNSCR 1325 and related Resolutions.

¹³ By now, besides, NATO and other governmental and international institutions were obliged to take account of subsequent UNSC Resolutions on 'Women, peace and security': 1820 of June 2008, 1888 and 1889 of October 2009, and 1960 of December 2010.

¹⁴ Naming specifically the United Nations, the European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and the International Committee of the Red Cross.

¹⁵ 27 January 2010. <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_61040.htm> accessed 7.4.11.

¹⁶ As footnote 12.

¹⁷ 'Role and experience of international organisations in implementation of UNSCR 1325 in Afghanistan', remarks by Dr. Stefanie Babst, Acting NATO Assistant Secretary at the Conference on Women, Peace and Security – the Afghan View. Tallinn, Estonia, 11 November 2010.
< http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_68078.htm?selectedLocale=en > accessed 7.4.11

¹⁸ As footnote 14.

¹⁹ See <http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_background.html> accessed 7.4.11.

²⁰ Felicity Hill, personal communication.

²¹ Cohn, Carol (2008) 'Mainstreaming Gender in UN Security Policy: A Path to Political Transformation' in Rai, Shirin M. and Georgina Waylen (eds) *Analysing and Transforming Global Governance: Feminist Perspectives*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

²² My research on movements to end war suggests that a particular contribution by women is, noting the continuation of violence against women into 'peacetime', to redefine what peace means. See Cockburn, Cynthia (forthcoming) *Antimilitarism: Political and Gender Dynamics of Movements to End War and Redefine Peace*. In process.

²³ Human Security Centre. 'What is Human Security.'
<<http://www.humansecurityreport.info/index.php>>

²⁴ See for instance Hamber, B. et al 'Discourses in transition: re-imagining women's security', *International Relations*, Vol.20 (4) 2006. Pp.487-502.

²⁵ As footnote 18.

²⁶ Cockburn, C., 'Gender as causal in militarization and war: a feminist standpoint', *International Feminist Journal of Politics*, Vol.12, No.2. May 2010. Pp.139-157.

²⁷ These questions are derived from a recent exchange of e-mails with Felicity Hill – to whom I am indebted for a much more informed and 'close in' view of the trajectory of Resolution 1325 than my own experience affords. However, the way they are formulated here is my own 'take' on the subject, and Felicity should not be held accountable for any errors (or infelicities – Ha!).

²⁸ See Feminism and Nonviolence Study Group (1983) *Piecing It Together: Feminism and Nonviolence*. Published by the group in co-operation with War Resisters' International, London.